OBJECTIVES: The aim of this paper is to analyse Baltic security developments from U.S. government and military resources, scholarly journal articles, and multinational public policy research institute assessments.
Introduction
Throughout its history the Baltic Sea region has been a source of extensive international trade and geopolitical importance (North and Kronenberg 2016 Kyle 2018, pp. 104-115) . Following World War I, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania enjoyed two decades of independence before the cataclysm of World War II saw these three countries absorbed by the former Soviet Union until they regained their independence in 1990. These countries have made steady economic and social progress becoming integrated into western political structures including the NATO alliance in 2004 (North and Kronenberg, Giguère 2007, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017) .
However, recent years have seen a reassertion of Russian nationalism under President Vladimir Putin which has sought to test NATO's resolve to defend its strategic interests. Russia's 2007 cyber attack against Estonia (McGuiness 2017 , Herzog 2011 , its intervention in Georgia in 2008, the forcible annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 (Kuhn 2018) , and aggressive Russian flyovers by two Russian Sukhoi Su-24 and a KA-28 Felix helicopter against the U.S. Navy's guided missile destroyer USS Donald Cook in the Baltic on April 11-12, 2016 has made the Baltics an increasingly important area of political emphasis, financial commitment and security interest for the U.S. over the last five years (U.S. Navy 2016, pp. 1-2, Milevski 2018, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 2017, Scheer 2019, pp. 10-17, Béraud-Sedreau and Giegerich 2018, 53-74) . Increasing U.S. Government and military interest in and international scholary analysis role in defending European freedom, lauded Poland's decision to purchase the U.S.' Patriot air and missile defense system, and urged NATO countries to meet their financial obligations to militarily support NATO security during a speech in Krasiński Square. One analysis of this speech stressed the symbolic importance of it being made at the site of the monument to the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, the importance of Poland and the Baltic Sea Region to European security, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO, and reminding Russia of the U.S.' awareness of this region's history (Remarks in Warsaw, Poland… 2017 , pp. 1-7, Thieme 2018 .
Trump's support for Baltic security was reaffirmed during an April 3, 2018 White House meeting with Baltic Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid of Estonia, Rajmonds Vejonis of Latvia, and Dalia Grybauskaitė of Lithuania. This meeting saw Trump announce that the U.S. intended to provide nearly $100 million for these countries to purchase large-caliber ammunition; over $70 million in training and equipping programs to enhance these countries military force national capacity building; and that more than 5,000 U.S. forces will join multinational forces participating in the Baltic region's 2018 Saber Strike exercise. Additional summit actions include the U.S. seeking to enhance Baltic energy infrastructure by providing expertise to prevent, detect, thwart, and recover from hostile cyberattacks; offering technical assistance to support energy diversification projects including synchronizing Baltic and European electric grids; providing $3 million to enable the Baltic countries to build public and institutional resiliency against disinformation by strengthening independent media outlets, public service broadcasters, and regional media literacy skills; and also promoting the centennial of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian independence through various educational and exchange programs (Joint Statement: A Declaration to Celebrate A 100 Years of Independence… 2018 , pp. 1-3, McNamara 2017 .
Congressional Action
The U.S. Congress is also a major partner in U.S. Baltic regional policy through its debates, legislative, funding, and oversight responsibilities deriving from Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution (Chapman 2016, pp. 85-86) . Congress seeks to influence U.S. policy through resolutions, debates, legislation, holding oversight hearings, and approving funding and requiring federal agencies to report on activities implementing Witnesses testifying at a June 23, 2016 briefing held by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) noted a recent groundbreaking ceremony that began construction of an Aegis ballistic missile defense base in Redzikowo, Poland, a quadrupling of the European Reassurance Initiative's (ERI) budget, the concern expressed over Russian military aircraft not turning their transponders on during interactions with western military aircraft, the belief expressed that Finland and Sweden could join NATO tomorrow if they chose to, and that over 20 European nations planned to increase their defense spending stemming from increasing Russian aggressiveness (U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2016, pp. 4, 7, 16, 18, 21 "Russia has chosen to be an adversary and imposes a long-term existential threat to the United States and our European allies and partners." Johnson also stressed that a long supply chain of over 5,000 miles by sea for the U.S. has to provide military reinforcement in Eastern Europe; stressed that the U.S. Army has only nine brigades which are U.S.-based and fewer than the number of U.S. aircraft carriers; and that Russian long-range surface-to-air missiles, submarines, and anti-ship missiles make it too dangerous to directly deploy forces to the Baltics. He stressed that getting these forces from Germany to the battlefield is problematic due to insufficient Eastern European transportation infrastructure for battle tanks and that there are insufficient logistic hubs for fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and medical services with these Germany-based services designed to sustain combat from 100 miles during the Cold War.
He stressed that despite the Ukrainian conflict and a poor readiness rate, Russia could still generate 26 battalion tactical groups in their Western Military District with three to seven days warning. Johnson concluded by saying that NATO's chances could be improved by adding three armored brigades to four infantry brigades capable of fighting at short warning to change combat outcomes. An effect of this would enable these forces to delay a Russian advance, retreat to defend national capitals, and use existing stocks of ammunition and fuel to give time for NATO reinforcements to provide assistance (U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2017, pp. 5, 7, 9) . 
US/NATO Countervailing Actions
Concern over possible Russian irredentism toward the Baltic countries has been prevalent for many years and reflected in NATO policymaking. NATO Air Policing seeks to maintain the airspace of NATO alliance members. Contributions come from all member countries and include national air surveillance systems, air traffic management, General 2017, pp. 20-21, 38, 46-47) .
Additional critical assessments of ERI were provided by Congress' Government Accountability Office (GAO) in December 2017 and January 2018. The December 2017 report determined that DOD had not prioritized ERI-funded posture initiatives against those in its base estimate; estimated their sustainment costs; or communicated future costs to Congress. GAO maintained that DOD has not used existing processes to plan for fund ERI posture initiatives; and that it does not communicate to Congress future costs of enduring ERI activities through OCO with DOD contending that providing such costs is outside its budgeting and programming processes (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2017, pp. 11-20) .
GAO recommendations to DOD in this report include: 1. DOD prioritizing ERI posture initiatives relative to those funded in its base budget relative to established posture planning processes. 2. DOD directing EUCOM and military services to develop estimates for sustaining prepositioned equipment and other ERI infrastructure projects and ensure the services plan for these long-term costs in future budgets. 2016, pp. 4, 103, 209, 238, 240-241, 360) .
Air Force analysis of Baltic security stresses that NATO Air Forces and the U.S. Air Force must quickly adapt to evolving strategic and technological realities including planning for air operations against a technologically advanced opponent like Russia. Such planning involves defending Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, recognizing that Russia is militarily at its strongest point since the Cold War, spreading NATO air assets to secondary airfields with pre-positioned fuel and munitions, and recognizing the strategic importance of Kaliningrad in relation to Lithuania. It also notes that Baltic region airfields risk attack from Russian SU-24 fighters employing precision or unguided air-to-surface ordnance, that an SU-24 flying at low-altitude attack profile speed would be over Estonia's Ämari Air Base ten minutes after crossing the Russo-Estonian border, and that Russian Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) such as the S-300 and S-400 could acquire and engage aircraft over eastern Estonia and Latvia (Clem, .
Another Air Force assessment produced the following table estimating how many Russian air strikes would occur in the first three days of a military operation against the Baltics: • Reserving the right to use nuclear weapons if the Russian state's existence is considered threatened by conventional attack with Russian military doctrine including the concept that a limited nuclear strike can force an enemy to "deescalate" an attack (McCabe 2016, pp. 70-71) .
Another writer in an Air Force publication stressed that whether or not Russia has territorial designs on the Baltic states, it is essential for the West to act to limit Russian actions toward the Baltic and elsewhere and that strengthening NATO's deterrent posture is critically important. Specific steps in this regard include ensuring that NATO forces can survive and fight in an environment of limited Russian nuclear escalation, increasing the active and passive defense of key NATO nodes and assets against conventional and nuclear strike, and ensuring the capability to penetrate advanced Russian systems such as the S-500 missile (Payne 2017, pp. 17, 19-20) .
Since Army forces will bear a significant percentage of the burden in Baltic combat operations against Russia, their analyses of this theater of operations are particularly insightful. The possibility that the condition of Russian ethnic minorities in Baltic states and other former Soviet republics could be used as a pretext for Russian military intervention is discussed in the Army's Military Review journal in 2018 (Sencerman 2018, pp. 41-49, Thornton and Karagiannis 2016, pp. 331-351) . The role of Belarus involving its geographic proximity to the Baltics and its occasionally problematic relationship with Russia, which may complicate Russian military operations against the Baltics, has also been scrutinized in Army assessments (Lanoszka 2018, pp. 75-84) .
The U.S. Army has also conducted exercises in the Baltic countries to signal Moscow of NATO willingness and capacity to defend its NATO partners. These exercises include Operation Saber Strike 2017 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland which served as a single tactical action covering operational, strategic, and tactical aspects of war. Saber Strike involved a multinational air assault, attack on an objective, and implementing forward lines of passage in southern Lithuania while also demonstrating a combined force's ability to executive a decisive tactical action, sequenced in time, space, and purpose conjoined with other tactical actions supporting an operational plan aimed at creating theater strategic effect. The Suwalki Gap in southern Lithuania, adjoining Poland, is a narrow and tough to defend 100 kilometer land gap with forests and marshes connecting Lithuanian and Polish border regions with the Baltic countries between Belarus and Russia's Kaliningrad exclave which could become a combat fulcrum in any conflict between NATO and Russia. Its elevation ranges from sea level to 309 meters above sea level, its forests are difficult to navigate due to the high density of rivers, lakes, and channels, and a limited road network. The Gap's temperature ranges from -4.4° C in January (reaching as low as -30°C) to a summer average of 17.4°C (reaching as high as 34.9°C). This region has been historically contested and fought over by Germany, Poland, and Russia during the two world wars (Kemper et al. 2018 , pp. 1-13, Geiger 2017 , pp. 1-2, Parafianowicz 2017 .
Project 1721, a 2017 U.S. Army War College analysis of Baltic security issues, is a particularly detailed and insightful analytical compendium on Russian European strategy and how to use U.S. landpower to counter Russian aspirations for regional hegemony. Written by a multinational collaboration of military professionals, Project 1721 describes how Russian strategic interest in the Baltic dates back to the rule of Peter the Great and the Great Northern War of 1700-1721 partially symbolized by the transfer of Russia's capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg. This work stresses that any effort desirous of providing strategic and operational assurance to the Baltics and deterring Russia must include diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) power instruments. It also stresses that a successful counter-Russian strategy must incorporate air, cyber, land, sea, and space power along with the participation and support of NATO allies and partners (Mastriano 2017 , Frost 2000 .
This work describes Russian objectives toward the Baltics as including building a land bridge with Kaliningrad, ensuring full access to and control of the Baltic Sea, restoring the former Soviet Union and Russian Federation's western boundaries, and causing NATO's collapse to restore Russia's European influence. It maintains that Moscow believes a limited intervention or disguised Baltic operation might be worth risking to test NATO's unity, stresses that Russia may use economic, financial, information, and political leverage to gain international influence, acknowledges that Russian military doctrine considers NATO's expanding military infrastructure toward Russia as a military danger, and that the Gerasimov Doctrine may see Russia employ non-military measures to disrupt opposition political decision-making processes and weakening the military and political unity of NATO opponents (Mastriano 2017, pp. 42-46) .
Recommendations for dealing with Russian threats prescribed by Project 1721 include enhancing NATO's early warning capability by developing a robust and early warning Baltic region intelligence capability commanded by a U.S. Army Colonel with extensive intelligence and NATO experience; increasing the size, survivability, and mobility of Baltic armed forces so they can respond to conventional and unconventional threats (Mastriano 2017, pp. 132-136) .
An essay in a Marine Corps publication stressed that Baltic security forces must be able to credibly deter Russian ambitions, NATO partners must build a security network between High North members and partners to enhance efficiencies and ensure unity of effort if there's a military confrontation with Russia, and NATO deterrence being designed to a quick Russian victory. This treatise acknowledged NATO's limited Russian attack response time due to the lack of natural boundaries and the short distance between Russia and the Baltic states. It stressed that Moscow would use hybrid war and provokatsiya (provocation) to achieve objectives short of all-out war; that the west should seek to deny Russia a quick victory by recognizing that it will take approximately 10 days for NATO heavy armor to reinforce the Baltics from Grafenwὂhr, Germany; that Baltic populations will bear the initial brunt of casualties and have to use guerilla tactics to delay the Russians, and that developing defense layers below the nuclear threshold is the best way to deter and defeat Russian aggression (Goldberg 2017, pp. 15-39 2016, pp. 2, 9, Lundqvist and Weiden 2015, pp. 42-48) .
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) stresses that Russian interest in the Baltic dates back to the 9th century as part of riverine trade connecting the Baltic and Black Seas, the 1703 establishment of Russia's Baltic Fleet, this fleet's combat readiness at the onset of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and the Baltic Fleet containing the following order of battle in 2015: 2 submarines, 2 guided missile destroyers, 1 guided missile frigate, 6 frigates, 11 guided missile patrol gun boats, 7 patrol gun boats, 4 landing ship tanks, and 2 utility landing craft. Russia also possesses a Baltic shipyard in St. Petersburg, the F.F. Ushakov Baltic Naval Institute is located in Kaliningrad, and on July 6, 2015, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Chirkov declared that "the nuclear submarine fleet is the priority in the navy shipbuilding program." The importance of submarines in the Baltic as a source of potential combat operations and as a gateway for Russian submarines desiring to reach the Atlantic remains of ongoing strategic importance. A chart accompanying this ONI assessment projected continuing growth in the number of Russia's Baltic Sea Fleet ships to 2030. The May 4, 2018 reestablishment of the 2nd Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations whose area of operations will include the North Atlantic also demonstrates tangible U.S. commitment to countering Russian naval assertiveness (U.S. Chief of Naval Operations 2018, p. 1, U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence 2015 , pp. xiii, xvi-svi, 16-17, 20, 30, Bruns 2019 .
Policy Research Institution Analysis
The Baltic's increasing importance has been analyzed intensively by U.S. and international nongovernmental public policy research institutions since 2014. In 2016, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) conducted an Assured Resolve Exercise simulation involving a hypothetical Russian attack against NATO. Assured Resolve found that the traditional balance between deterrence, response, and escalation was dangerously offset with U.S. and Baltic members being more willing to quickly invoke NATO's Article CSIS report recommendations include: 
Conclusions
Recent and ongoing U.S. government and public policy literature and political debate recognizes that Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine also applies to the Baltic region. All NATO countries must acknowledge the reality that a new Cold War exists with a revisionist Russia. The U.S., its NATO allies, and Nordic partner countries like Finland and Sweden must accept this inescapable geopolitical reality and bluntly inform domestic public opinion that continuing increases in military spending and force deployment in the Nordic and Baltic regions will be essential for the forseeable future.
Continuing military exercises must occur in Poland and the Baltic countries and include drills to defend these countries and simulate exercises to capture Kaliningrad and detach it from Russia if military conflict occurs. Air forces must continually patrol Baltic skies, surface and sub-surface naval forces must continually monitor Russian maneuvers, and intelligence capabilities need to be strengthened against Russian active measures and provocations across the entire combat spectrum including space. Forces executing these countermeasures must be given liberal rules of engagement in the event of hostile interaction with Russian or Russian-allied forces (Ringsmose and Rynning 2017, pp. 129-146, Götz 2019, pp. 99-117) .
These countries also need to strengthen their cyber resilience and critical infrastructure resilience to counteract Russian attempts to disable these assets which are critical to multiple civilian and military activities. Adroitly responding to and counteracting Russian attempts to influence and manipulate public opinion must also be ongoing efforts of the U.S. and its allies. There must be continuing development of allied ballistic missile defense and precision-guided munitions capabilities to counter ongoing Russian military technological advances. Installing anti-personnel land mines in these countries Russian border regions should also be considered. The U.S. and its allies need to upgrade their military doctrine to emphasize their ability and willingness to take decisive measures to defeat covert or overt Russian military and non-military action against the Baltics. Ongoing defense spending increases by Baltic region countries must be sustained to cope with the continually evolving Russian threat. The June 12, 2019 announcement that Poland will purchase 32 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and that the U.S. will send 1,000 troops to Poland at a White House meeting between President Trump and Polish President Andrzej Duda indicates some level of commitment to increasing NATO resolve toward Russia. There must be continuing dialogue with Russia to demonstrate western willingness to international opinion to keep hostilities from inadvertently breaking out. This communication must be coordinated and candid across the NATO alliance and from Finland and Sweden to ensure that Moscow does not attempt to exploit potential policy differences between these countries. Both Helsinki and Stockholm need to abandon their Cold War era morally relativistic neutrality and join NATO as soon as possible to enhance alliance diplomatic solidarity and military interoperability. Moscow must be repeatedly warned in public and confidential communications that any attempt to militarily invade the Baltics or subvert these countries through active measures will result in devastating diplomatic, economic, military, and political consequences for the Kremlin. Unflinching realism, diplomatic cohesion, and ongoing efforts to develop and sustain credible military forces capable of deterring then defeating Russia if military confrontation occurs must be hallmark characteristics of U.S. and western policy toward Moscow. Overcoming the partisan divisions caused and lingering from Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election presently makes achieving greater Baltic policy cohesion extremely difficult. Following many of the recommendations contained in the analyses documented in this assessment will be critical if protecting Baltic nations' hard-won freedom and independence is to be maintained. The Baltic needs to rank at least as highly in U.S. and NATO strategic calculation as other strategically critical regions including China and the Western Pacific, North Korea, Iran, the Middle East, and South Asia. Actions over the forthcoming longue durée will determine if the U.S. and its allies are successful in defending Baltic freedom and security (Béraud-Sudreau 2019, pp. 94-122, Hamilton 2019 , p. 334-348, President Donald Trump 2019 .
